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Abstract
This paper measures the impact of labor market policies (LMPs) on regular employ-
ment. Contrary to previous empirical studies,we conduct an econometric analysis
based on sound theoretical foundations. The speciﬁcation is based on an equilibrium
job search model where LMPs aﬀect tightness on the labor market. The impacts of a
comprehensive set of LMPs on the regular employment rate and on wages are jointly
estimated. Taking care of the endogeneity of LMPs,our results for Belgium indicate
that unemployment beneﬁts have a positive,yet small,impact on wages and a neg-
ative one on the employment rate. The rate of sanctions has a small negative eﬀect
on wages. Their impact on the employment rate is however negative. This can be
understood if the eﬃciency of the sanctioned in the matching process is suﬃciently
lower than the one of the insured unemployed. Training programmes have a small
negative eﬀect on wages and a small positive one on employment. Our analysis also
shows that the results can be sensitive to the choice made about the exogeneity of
LMPs.
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11 Introduction
The employment guidelines of the European Council Resolution at the end of 1997 called
notably for a clear shift towards more ‘active labor market policies’ (ALMPs). In many
countries,given the strict ﬁnancial constraints upon public and social security expendi-
tures,the following questions have become more acute : What type of ALMPs should be
developed and what is the appropriate balance between ﬁnancial means spent on ALMPs
and on ‘passive labor market policies’ (PLMPs)? Much attention has been paid to the
microeconomic inﬂuence of labor market policies (LMPs) on the functioning of the labor
market (see Pedersen and Westergard-Nielsen,1993,OECD,1993,Calmfors,1994). Much
less eﬀort,as argued by Calmfors and Lang (1993),has been devoted to the measurement
of the macroeconomic eﬀects of these labor market policies. This paper is concerned with
the latter.
The literature on the macroeconomic eﬀects of LMPs can be classiﬁed under two main
headings. Due to space limitation,we only provide a selective and highly condensed review
of some contributions. Some sophisticated theoretical analyses have been developed where
the link between either PLMPs or ALMPs and wage formation has been emphasized (see
e.g. Holmlund and Lundborg,1989,Holmlund and Lind´ en,1993,Calmfors and Lang,
1993,1995). In the case of ALMPs,two eﬀects go in opposite directions. First,they are
supposed to enhance or at least maintain eﬀective labor-force participation. Second,these
policies typically reduce the disutility of being laid oﬀ and this eﬀect pushes wages upwards
and employment downwards. By ‘employment’,the theoretical literature actually means
employment in proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms. This indicator is also called ‘regular employment’.
It does not include the number of individuals occupied in the various ALMPs.
The empirical literature can be classiﬁed according to the evaluation criterion used.
Some papers have analyzed the eﬀect of LMPs on wages. They often conclude that
ALMPs have a wage-push eﬀect. This evidence has been recently questioned for Swe-
den by Forslund and Kolm (2000). To estimate the eﬀect of LMPs on the unemployment
rate or the unemployment exit rate,a matching function or a Beveridge curve is aug-
mented with some labor market policy indicators (see e.g. Haskel and Jackman,1988,
Jackman,Pissarides and Savouri,1990,Boeri and Burda,1996,Dor,Van der Linden and
Lopez-Novella,1997 and the contributions in de Koning and Mosley,2001). This ap-
proach can be criticized on at least three grounds. First,it only provides an estimation of
the parameters of interest given the vacancy (or the unemployment-vacancy) level. Yet,
2the theoretical literature emphasizes that labor market policies should have an impact
on wage-setting and hence on the number of vacant jobs. Moreover,in many countries,
the vacancies registered by Employment Agencies are not very reliable. They represent a
varying (and sometimes highly selective) proportion of the actual number of vacancies in
the economy. Finally,the lack of a theoretical foundation has the consequence that this
empirical literature is presumably guided too much by ‘what the observable data tell’.
This paper uses time-series data to estimate the impact of LMPs on the regular employ-
ment rate. Contrary to most of earlier empirical papers that focussed either on ALMPs
or on PLMPs,the eﬀects of PLMPs and ALMPs are here jointly estimated. Moreover,
the speciﬁcation of the estimated model is very diﬀerent and,to us at least,more appro-
priate. We do not specify a model conditional on a set of LMP indicators and on the
ratio between vacancies and the number of job searchers (‘tightness’ on the labor market).
Instead,following the afore-mentioned theoretical literature,we replace the latter ratio by
its determinants. These are the LMP indicators and a list of structural variables (such
as the job destruction rate). This approach requires to isolate the relevant variables and
to derive the theoretical sign of their net eﬀect on tightness. For this purpose,Section
2 generalizes the basic equilibrium job search model of Pissarides (2000) by considering
four labor market states : Insured unemployment,uninsured unemployment,training and
regular employment. The literature based on the Pissarides approach has sometimes cali-
brate his model and produced simulation results (see e.g. Mortensen and Pissarides,1999).
However,we are not aware of previous attempts to estimate an econometric model derived
from the Pissarides model.
Section 3 presents the original data set we have gathered for Belgium. The choice
of this country was motivated by the availability of long time-series data that display
suﬃcient variability within the sample. It should ﬁrst be emphasized that long time
series of administrative data covering a comprehensive set of LMPs are rarely available.
In the case of Belgium,we are able to jointly analyze the eﬀect of training programs,
unemployment beneﬁts and sanctions (i.e. insured unemployed people who lose their
beneﬁts for various reasons). Second,Belgian data on LMPs interestingly present a lot
of variation. After two jumps during the seventies,the average replacement ratio has
sharply declined during the eighties (from about 0.45 to 0.35). The number and the rate
of sanctions ﬂuctuate a lot with a sharp increase at the beginning of the nineties. The
eﬀort put into training has substantially increased during the eighties and nineties.
The empirical results are summarized in Section 4. In this analysis we take care of
3biases that could result from the endogeneity of LMPs (see e.g. Calmfors,1994). Section
5 concludes the paper.
2 Labor market policies and equilibrium tightness on the
labor market
The aim of this section is to identify the determinants of tightness and of the equilibrium
employment rate. These determinants will be used in Section 4 to specify an econometric
model. This section shows that many LMPs have a clear-cut eﬀect on tightness but not
on the equilibrium employment rate. The empirical exercise of Section 4 will allow to
sign these theoretically ambiguous eﬀects. Since we intend to estimate the impacts of
both PLMPs and ALMPs,our model has to be suﬃciently general to deal with both
passive and active measures. The main features of the theoretical model developed below
are relevant for most industrialized countries. Some speciﬁc assumptions are however
introduced to ﬁt the Belgian institutional context.
2.1 A theoretical framework for the analysis of LMPs
This section extends the theoretical matching model of Pissarides (2000) to the case of four
states on the labor market : Insured unemployment,uninsured unemployment,training
and regular employment (‘employment’ for short). The ﬁrst two states are distinguished in
order to emphasize the role of sanctions on the equilibrium employment rate. Some of the
unemployed do not receive unemployment insurance (UI) beneﬁts for two broad reasons.
Either they are not entitled (e.g. because their past record of insured employment is too
short) or beneﬁt has ceased to be paid (e.g. because of a misconduct or of limited duration
of entitlement). In this model,we focus on the latter reason (called ‘sanctions’). 1 The
third state identiﬁes the formerly unemployed who are being trained.2
This model draws upon Holmlund and Lind´ en (1993) who distinguish three states :
Unemployment,‘relief jobs’ (i.e. direct job creation for the unemployed,in the public and
non-proﬁt sector) and ‘regular’ employment. On the labor market,there are important
information imperfections and frictions related to various heterogeneities. These are not
explicitly modeled but are summarized by the matching technology. Therefore,although
1Considering sanctions only is appropriate for Belgium where only 5% of claimants were considered as
ineligible to UI beneﬁts during the nineties.
2More generally, this state could identify other ALMPs (see Van der Linden and Dor, 2001).
4the model formally deals with homogeneous workers and jobs,the matching function will
capture in a convenient way heterogeneities that are present both on the supply and the
demand sides of the labour market. Assume a continuous-time setting. The ﬂow of hires,
H,is a function of the number of job-seekers, S,and the number of vacancies, V . Let
H = h(S,V ) be the aggregate matching function. It is now standard to assume this
function to be increasing,concave and homogeneous of degree 1. S is not simply the sum
of the number of insured unemployed, U,the number of trainees, R,and the number of
uninsured unemployed, X. These jobless workers are presumably not equivalent as far as
the matching process is concerned. So, S has to weight the various types of workers in
order to measure ‘eﬃciency units’. To this end,each type of job-seeker receives a speciﬁc
‘matching eﬀectiveness parameter’ ci,i= u,r,x (‘eﬀectiveness’ for short). For tractability
reasons,these parameters are taken as exogenous. We will come back to that assumption
at the end of this section. With these notations,the number S of job-seekers (measured
in eﬃciency units) is cuU + crR + cxX.
The labor force is made up of L individuals (L is exogenously given and L ≡ E +U +
X +R,where E denotes employment). Let lower case letters e,u,x and r denote the rates
of individuals in the various states (e.g. e ≡ E
L). Let tightness on the labor market (i.e. the
ratio V
S ) be denoted by θ. It should be emphasized that tightness is measured in eﬃciency
units. The rate at which vacant jobs become ﬁlled is q(θ) ≡ H/V = h(1
θ,1),q (θ) < 0. Let
the hiring rate be deﬁned as
h(S,V )
S = θq(θ) and denoted by α(θ) with α (θ) > 0.
Figure 1 summarizes the ﬂows between the four states. The arrival rate of job oﬀers
is cuα for an insured unemployed worker, cxα for an uninsured unemployed and crα for
a trainee. Although cu,c x and cr are parameters,the job arrival rates are endogenous
because they vary with θ. As will soon be clear,the parameters of the model are such that
a job is always preferred to each of the three other states. Each job match is assumed to be
subject to the same exogenous rate of termination φ. Any worker whose job is terminated
is assumed to be eligible for UI.3 To enter a training scheme,a jobless worker has to transit
into the insured unemployment state.4 γ denotes the exogenous arrival rate of training
oﬀers.5 The parameters of the problem will be such that the unemployed always ﬁnd
3In the Belgian context, it can be assumed that laid-oﬀ workers receive UI beneﬁts.
4This assumption ﬁts the Belgian rules rather well. Holmlund and Lind´ en (1993) deals with the possi-
bility that those separated from a job enter directly a relief job.
5In Belgium, the unemployed who apply for a training scheme have to queue until a ‘training slot’
becomes available (Cockx and Bardoulat, 1999). This supports our way of modeling.
5interesting to enter a training scheme. A training program ends at an exogenous rate λ.6 It
is assumed that λ ≥ φ.7 Finally,there is a limited duration of entitlement to UI. Recipients
have their beneﬁt terminated at an exogenous rate π.8 In that case,they are entitled to
a (lower) assistance beneﬁt for an indeﬁnite duration. Once UI beneﬁt is exhausted,a
worker must be hired before he becomes eligible again.9 Uninsured unemployed have no
access to training schemes.10
The relative value of the ci parameters is important. We argue that training programs
typically improve human capital or they ‘signal’ more productive workers.11 Furthermore,
compared to the unemployed,trainees often have closer contacts with the Public Employ-
ment Services and with ﬁrms (where some of them are trained). This arguably gives them
an informational advantage. It is very plausible that these eﬀects outweigh the reduction
of time available for searching,so that cr ≥ cu.
Consider now the relative value of cx with respect to cu. First,it has been argued that
compared to non-claimants “beneﬁt claimants maintain a closer attachment to the labour
market and appear more able to prolong search eﬀort” (Wadsworth,1991). See also Blau
and Robins (1990). Second,the unemployed enter the state of uninsured unemployment
(X) after being insured unemployed (U). Therefore,discouragement can explain why their
eﬀectiveness parameter is lower (see Calmfors and Lang,1995). A third argument is
concerned with the rate of job oﬀers. A ranking of job-applicants according to their
unemployment duration or according to their status (being sanctioned may be a signal of
6Since the model is markovian, a spell in training does not aﬀect the characteristics of workers once
they have moved to other states (e.g. when they are back into unemployment).
7This assumption is supported by casual data from the administrations in charge of training schemes
and by the results in Cockx and Bardoulat (1999) and Cockx, Van der Linden and Karaa (1998).
8To motivate this modeling, notice that there is evidence that a substantial share of Belgian insured
unemployed ignores the rules according to which they can be sanctioned (De Lathouwer, Bogaerts and
Perelman, 2000). Moreover, these rules let some discretionary power to local public employment agencies
that implement them.
9Other analyses of the general equilibrium impact of sanctions have been developed by Atkinson (1995),
Ljungqvist and Sargent (1995) and Boone and van Ours (2000). Our model can also be related to Fredriks-
son and Holmlund (2001) and Cahuc and Lehmann (2000) who use a matching framework to analyze the
proﬁle of the replacement ratio as a function of unemployment duration. Abbring, van den Berg and van
Ours (1999) develop a job-search model with probabilistic sanctions (understood as a permanent decrease
in unemployment beneﬁts). Our theoretical setting could be extended to the case of temporary sanctions.
This would complicate the model without adding much insight.
10This is in accordance with stylized facts in Belgium.
11For Belgium, Cockx and Bardoulat (1999) concludes that training programs substantially improve the
hiring rate of the beneﬁciaries.
6bad characteristics such as a low attachment to the labour market) can also be invoked
to justify that the uninsured unemployed receive less job oﬀers than the insured ones.
Nevertheless,it could be argued that uninsured unemployed turn down less oﬀers because
their reservation wage must be lower or that they search more intensively. However,there
is a growing evidence that the unemployed turn down very few oﬀers (see van den Berg,
1990,Devine and Kiefer,1991,Warren,1997 and Table 4.2 in OECD,2000). In addition,
there is at least some evidence that search intensity is not much inﬂuenced by the level of
beneﬁts (see Schmitt and Wadsworth,1993). So,the assumption cu >c x is arguably the
most realistic one.
The assumption cr ≥ cu >c x combined with a very plausible ranking of the respective
replacement ratios (see below) will allow clear-cut conclusions about the direction in which
LMPs aﬀect tightness on the labor market.12
The model is developed in a steady state. The ﬂows between the four states on the labor
market keep e,u,x and r constant. These conditions lead to the following expressions :
(crα(θ)+λ)r = γu, (1)
φ(1 − u − r − x)=α(θ)(cuu + crr + cxx), (2)
cxα(θ)x = πu. (3)
Let ∆ ≡ [(cuα(θ)+π + φ)(crα(θ)+λ)+γ(crα(θ)+φ)]cxα(θ)+φπ(crα(θ)+λ). For a
given value of θ,equations (1),(2),(3) and the identity e ≡ 1−u−r−x determine e,u,x
and r. In particular,
e =[ ( cuα(θ)+π)(crα(θ)+λ)+γcrα(θ)]cxα(θ)∆−1, (4)
u = φcxα(θ)(crα(θ)+λ)∆−1. (5)
Equation 4 deﬁnes an increasing relationship between e and θ.
12As far as tightness is concerned, if the assumption cr ≥ cu >c x was rejected, the same qualitative
conclusions could also be reached provided that the conditions on the relative replacement ratios become
more restrictive.
7Proposition 1. For a given level of tightness measured
in eﬃciency units, the regular employment rate e increases
with the parameters cu,c x,c r and with the rate φ. Moreover,
under the assumption cr ≥ cu >c x, e is an increasing func-
tion of the rate γ and a decreasing function of λ and π (see
also Table 1).
Proof. See Appendix 1.
So,if cr ≥ cu >c x,increasing the rate of entry into training programs will improve the
employment rate as long as θ remains unchanged. Increasing the rate of sanctions has the
opposite eﬀect. These properties are quite intuitive.
To derive θ,we now turn to the determination of vacancies and wages. When the
presentation draws heavily upon Holmlund and Lind´ en (1993),it will only set out the
essentials. The number of vacancies is chosen by the ﬁrms. If a job terminates,the ﬁrm
and the worker will have to engage in a costly search process before they can meet another
partner. This gives rise to a rent that will be shared according to the Nash solution to a
bargaining over wages. Assume that ﬁrms are homogeneous and that each ﬁrm has only
one job. The ﬁrm’s discounted expected return from an occupied (respectively,vacant)
job is denoted Jo (respectively Jv). Let δ be the discount rate, y the constant marginal
product of a ﬁlled vacancy, wc the real cost of labor and k the ﬁxed cost of a vacant job
per unit of time. Jo and Jv satisfy two familiar conditions :
δJo = y − wc + φ(Jv − Jo), (6)
δJv = −k + q(θ)(Jo − Jv). (7)
In equilibrium,vacancies are opened as long as they yield a positive expected return.
Therefore,the equilibrium condition for the supply of vacancies is Jv = 0. Using (6) and
(7),this equilibrium condition can be rewritten as :




This relationship,the ‘vacancy-supply curve’,says that the marginal product of a ﬁlled
vacancy should be equal to the wage cost plus the expected capitalized value of the hiring
cost. Conditional on y,δ,φ and k,equality (8) deﬁnes the feasible wage cost as a function
8of θ (if the labor market becomes more tight,i.e. θ increases,the cost of ﬁlling a vacancy
increases; hence the wage cost that the ﬁrm can aﬀord decreases,too).
Let Λe,Λ u,Λ x and Λr be the present-discounted value of the expected income stream
of,respectively,an employed worker,an insured unemployed,an uninsured unemployed
and a trainee. Assume linear taxes. If w denotes the real net wage, wc ≡ w(1 + τ). In a
steady-state equilibrium,the four expected lifetime incomes are related by the following
conditions :
δΛe = w + φ(Λu − Λe), (9)
δΛu = bu + cuα(Λe − Λu)+γ(Λr − Λu)+π(Λx − Λu), (10)
δΛr = br + crα(Λe − Λr)+λ(Λu − Λr), (11)
δΛx = s + cxα(Λe − Λx), (12)
where bu, br and s denote respectively the unemployment beneﬁt,the beneﬁt paid to the
trainees and the assistance beneﬁt. We assume that these beneﬁts are proportional to
wages. Let ρu, ρr and σ be the corresponding replacement ratios (ρu ≡ bu
w , ρr ≡ br
w and
σ ≡ s
w). The choice of these beneﬁt levels has to be incentive compatible. Given that
by assumption cr ≥ cu >c x > 0,the conditions 1 >ρ r ≥ ρu ≥ σ ≥ 0 are suﬃcient to
guarantee that Λe > Λr > Λu > Λx. This can be seen by solving equations (9) to (12)(see
Appendix 1 for a proof). In particular,Λ e−Λu = wf(α(θ),Z) where f(α(θ),Z) is deﬁned
as :
(δ + cxα)[(1 − ρu)(δ + crα + λ)+γ(1 − ρr)] + π(δ + crα + λ)(1 − σ)
(δ + cxα)[(δ + crα + λ)(cuα + φ + δ)+γ(crα + φ + δ)] + π(δ + crα + λ)(φ + δ + cxα)
, (13)
with α = α(θ) and Z ≡ (δ,cu,c x,c r,γ,λ,φ,π,ρ u,ρ r,σ) . It is immediately seen that
expression (13) is positive.
The wage rate is derived from the maximization of the following Nash product :13
max
w (Λe − Λu)
β (Jo − Jv)
1−β , (14)
with 0 <β<1. The ﬁrst-order condition can be written as :
y − wc =
1 − β
β
(Λe − Λu)(δ + φ)(1 + τ) (15)
13Wages can be renegotiated at any time. So, whatever his previous state on the labor market, the
fallback level for a worker is the position of insured unemployment.
9The higher the diﬀerence in expected value between employment and insured unemploy-
ment the lower the negotiated wage. Combining (15) and (13) leads to the following





β (δ + φ)f(α(θ),Z)
. (16)
This relationship between wc and θ is upward-sloping because
∂f
∂α < 0 (a proof is provided





The upper part of Figure 2 illustrates the two equilibrium relationships (8) and (17) when
k is a constant. This ﬁgure is easily adapted if k is proportional to wc. The lower part of
Figure 2 displays Equation (4). Finally,combining (8) and (17),it is easily seen that the
equilibrium value of θ solves the following implicit equation :




Hence the tax rate τ does not the equilibrium level of tightness θ (on this issue,see
Holmlund (2000)).
2.2 Comparative-static properties of equilibrium
The comparative statics is summarized in Table 1. This table displays the sign of the eﬀects
of the ‘labor market policies parameters’ (γ,λ,π,ρu,ρ r,σ) and the ‘structural parameters’
of this economy (cu,c x,c r,φ,δ,k,β,y) on the equilibrium values of θ and e. The second
column recalls Proposition 1. The third (respectively,the fourth) column indicates in
which direction the wage-setting curve (17) (respectively,the vacancy-supply curve (8))
shifts as the parameter increases. From the eﬀects on the two latter curves,the inﬂuence
on the equilibrium level of tightness θ is seen in the ﬁfth column. The last column is
devoted to the net eﬀect on e. It combines the direct eﬀect conditional on θ (column 2)
and the indirect one through the change in θ.
Proposition 2. Assume that cr ≥ cu >c x. Higher rates
of training oﬀers (γ) decrease θ but have an ambiguous net
eﬀect on the employment rate e. On the contrary, increasing
the rate at which training programs end (λ) or the rate of
sanctions (π) has a positive eﬀect on θ and an ambiguous
one on e. Finally, raising the replacement ratios (ρu,ρ r,σ)
decreases both θ and e.
10Proof. The proof of the eﬀects on the wage-setting curves is left to Appendix 1. On
the basis of these results,the proof of proposition 1 can be stated intuitively as follows.
Recalling that θ is measured in eﬃciency units,the LMPs have no eﬀect on the vacancy-
supply curve. When they improve (deteriorate) the expected lifetime income in case of
unemployment,they push the wage-setting curve upwards (downwards). Hence,the equi-
librium value of θ decreases (respectively,increases). Raising γ improves the intertemporal
discounted value of being unemployed. Hence,higher wages are bargained over (for a given
value of tightness). With an unchanged vacancy-supply schedule,this eventually leads to a
lower equilibrium value for θ. The same holds for the replacement ratios (ρu,ρ r, σ). Since
Equation (4) is not aﬀected by the replacement ratios, e decreases with ρu,ρ r, σ. On the
contrary,increasing the rate of participation into programs has a direct positive eﬀect on
e (according to Proposition 1). Therefore,the net eﬀect on e is ambiguous. Conversely,
increasing the rate at which training schemes expire (λ) or increasing the rate of sanctions
(π) deteriorates the position of the unemployed and leads to an increase in tightness θ.
The ambiguous eﬀect on e comes from the direct eﬀect of Proposition 1.
Turning to ‘structural parameters’,an improvement in the eﬀectiveness parameters
(cu,c x or cr) has a negative impact on the diﬀerence Λe −Λu at given wage and tightness
levels (see (13) and Appendix 1). Workers negotiate higher wages to compensate this
eﬀect (at given θ). Since,the vacancy-supply curve is left unchanged,the ultimate eﬀect
is a reduction in equilibrium tightness. Yet,because more eﬀective job seekers have a
direct favorable eﬀect on e (Proposition 1),the net eﬀect on the employment rate is
ambiguous. More bargaining power given to the workers (β) also leads to higher wages
and to lower equilibrium values for θ and e. The rate of job termination φ,the discount
rate δ and the cost of posting vacancies are the only parameters that have an impact on
both the vacancy-supply and the wage-setting curves. Increasing any of these parameters
reduces the equilibrium expected return from an (occupied or vacant) job and therefore
leads to the opening of less vacancies at given wages. Using (13),it can be checked that
Λe − Λu is a decreasing function of φ and δ at given wage and tightness levels (see also
Appendix 1). To compensate this eﬀect,workers negotiate a higher wage (at given θ).
The combined shift of the wage-setting and vacancy-supply curves induced by an increase
in φ or δ unambiguously lowers the equilibrium value of θ. The equilibrium employment
rate shrinks,too. Finally,more productive matches (a higher y) raise Jo and therefore
imply that more vacancies are posted at given wages. Since the wage-setting schedule (17)
is unaﬀected,the equilibrium value of θ moves upwards. So does the employment rate.
11Up to now we have assumed that each of the LMPs could be modiﬁed without aﬀecting
eﬀectiveness (namely,the ci’s). This is questionable. Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001)
develop a theoretical equilibrium search model where search intensity among the insured
and the uninsured unemployed is endogenous (and therefore a function of the replacement
ratio and the rate of sanctions). In this more general setting,they also ﬁnd that the
equilibrium level of θ increases with π and decreases with the replacement ratio. Therefore,
we can conclude that the qualitative properties in Table 1 are fairly robust in this type of
model.
The determinants of tightness in equilibrium can now be used to specify an econometric
model for the employment rate. Before,let us introduce our original data set. This
presentation will highlight some additional features that should be incorporated in the
econometric analysis.
3 The data
The available data set covers the period 1961-1999 (see also Appendix 2). To measure reg-
ular employment Et,we take employment in ﬁrms (wage earners and salaried employees,
excluding the public sector). According to the theoretical model,we divide this employ-
ment level by the size of the labor force Lt. Let us call this ratio the ‘ﬁrms’ employment
rate’ (see Figure 3). This ﬁgure highlights cyclical ﬂuctuations but also long-lasting shifts
(for instance following the oil shocks).
All information about LMPs is measured on a civil year basis. The unemployment
beneﬁt system will ﬁrst be characterized by an aggregate replacement ratio. We cannot
observe both ρu,ρ x and ρr. The available replacement ratio is equal to the average paid
out (real) unemployment beneﬁt, bt,divided by the average real net wage rate, wt (see
Figure 3). This ratio will capture the evolution of most relevant allowances. Since the
unemployment beneﬁts are proportional to the wage rate (with lower- and upper-bounds),
it is not surprising that bt and wt are correlated. Moreover,since the replacement ratio
has sometimes been adapted in response to the rise in unemployment,we will have to
take care of a possible dependency between bt and the unemployment rate. The average
replacement ratio has substantially increased during the seventies but is currently back to
its level of the sixties.
In Belgium,the entitlement duration is usually said to be unbounded (see Chapter
2 of OECD,1996). Nevertheless,conditional upon household’s composition and income,
12beneﬁt entitlement ceases if the length of the spell exceeds a regional- and duration-
dependent criterion (see OECD,1997). 14 In addition to this loss of entitlement due to a
‘too long’ unemployment spell,beneﬁt may be withdrawn for a ﬁxed period or permanently
if for instance the individual is considered as unavailable for a job or if he refuses a
suitable job oﬀer.15 The available measure of ‘sanctions’ is an aggregate indicator of all
disqualiﬁcations (whether they are motivated by a ‘too long’ spell or by other reasons).
The rate of sanctions πt is measured by the ratio of the annual ﬂow of disqualiﬁcations,
EXCt,and the total stock of insured unemployed, Ut. The plot of this series is presented in
Figure 4. As an illustration of the simultaneity problem highlighted by Calmfors (1994),it
can be seen that the number of sanctions often ﬂuctuates with the level of unemployment.
There exists no long time series of the ﬂow of entries into training programs. However,
we have been able to construct a time series for the annual number of unemployed who end
a training program organized or recognized by the Employment Agencies, Tt. This ﬂow
mixes returns into unemployment and exits from training towards employment16. From
equation (1),we estimate γ by the ratio between Tt and the stock of unemployed. This
variable clearly pools diﬀerent types of training schemes,both within a given year and all
along our sample period. Figure 4 shows the rapid development of training policies during
the last ﬁfteen years.
The rate of job termination leading to an unemployment inﬂow, φ,is approximated
by the number of insured unemployed with a duration of less than three months, U<3m
t ,
divided by the population at risk (the total number of wage earners and salaried employees,
ETt). This rate presents a clear break around 1974 (see Figure 5).
The discount rate is sometimes approximated by a long-term real interest rate. How-
ever,it turns out to be a poor empirical proxy. So we here assume that this structural
parameter is constant.
In the theoretical model, y is the constant marginal product. We measure it by di-
viding real GDP by total employment (see Figure 5). Firms’ employment is however also
aﬀected by business cycle conditions that are not entirely captured by GDP per head
(which includes the quite large public sector). Therefore,business cycle indicators will be
introduced (and denoted ‘BCI’).
14In that case, the individual has to work during at least a year before any further eligibility becomes
possible (this length varies with age).
15In the permanent case, the previous footnote applies, too.
16Therefore, we are unable to measure λ.
13The bargaining power of the workers (or their representative) β should also be included
in this analysis. We feel that the degree of unionization is a very poor proxy in Belgium
since this country has a system of mandatory extension of sectoral collective agreements
to the entire industry. Moreover,unemployment beneﬁts are administered more eﬃciently
by unions than by the public agency. This clearly should aﬀect unions’ membership. So,in
the speciﬁcation presented below,we introduce another proxy for the bargaining power,
namely the frequency of strikes. This variable measures the annual number of strikes
(‘strikes’) divided by the size of the active population (see Figure 5). Until 1993,strikes
are disaggregated according to two motives (wages and employment). The latter reason
motivates between 30 and 40% of the strikes.
For tractability reasons,the theoretical model assumed workers and ﬁrms to be ho-
mogeneous. However,in order to explain the evolution of ﬁrms’ employment during four
decades,we have to take compositional changes into account. The share of women in reg-
ular employment (denoted by ‘sharew’) has increased a lot (see Figure 5). Including this
share among the regressors will capture both a supply-side eﬀect,the development of part-
time jobs and a sectoral shift (since the development of female employment parallels the
one of the service sector). Furthermore,the substantial decrease of the ﬁrms’ employment
rate between 1974 and the mid-eighties coincides with a dramatic decline of the secondary
sector that is not well captured by the variable ‘sharew’. Therefore,we will condition our
estimation on an additional variable that measures the share of the secondary sector in
aggregate value added,‘ shares’ (see Figure 5).
4 The empirical analysis
4.1 The speciﬁcation
Equation (4) can be rewritten as e = E1(θ,γ,λ,π,φ,cu,c r,c x). Moreover,Equation (18)
can be rewritten as θ =Θ ( γ,λ,π,φ,cu,c r,c x,ρ u,ρ r,σ,y,δ,β,k). Substituting this equa-
tion in the former leads to an equation e = E2(γ,λ,π,φ,cu,c r,c x,ρ u,ρ r,σ,y,δ,β,k). We
log-linearize this equation and formally assume the constancy of k,δ,cu,c r,c x.17 We also
17In a sensitivity analysis (available upon request), we have assumed that k is a log-linear function of
the wage cost (since a major part of the cost of opening vacancies is made of working hours spent on tasks
such as advertising, screening of applicants and the like). The sign of the estimated parameters remain
unchanged and their magnitude is nearly not aﬀected. Hence, we will present the most parsimonious
speciﬁcation.
14assume that the ﬂuctuations of ρr and σ are well captured by the ones of the observable
ρu. In the absence of data about λ,this leads to the following basic long-run speciﬁcation
for the ﬁrms’ employment rate:
ln(e)=a0 + a1ln(y)+a2ln(φ)+a3ln(γ)+a4ln(π)+a5ln(ρu)+a6ln(β), (19)





















where ln(yt) will be replaced by a vector of indicators introduced in the previous section
and a1 is now a vector,too.
According to the theoretical analysis the sign of a1 should be positive and the ones
of a2,a 5 and a6 negative. Following Proposition 2,the signs of a3 and a4 are a priori
ambiguous under the hypothesis that cr ≥ cu >c x.
The descriptive analysis of the previous section suggested that the econometric analysis
should carefully take care of simultaneity biases. The latter could come from two sources.
First,there could be a reverse causality between the ﬁrms’ employment rate (or the related
unemployment rate) and the development of programs (γ,π,ρu). Second,many variables
of interest have the level of unemployment at their denominator. For these reasons,we
estimate a system of equations. The ﬁrst equation will be based on Equation (20) in which
the numerator and the denominator of each ratio are introduced explicitly. In this way,we
will be able to add explicit relationships between the programs (the numerators of γ,π,ρu)
and indicators of the labour market. Moreover,since the theoretical model emphasizes
the role of LMPs on wages and because the level of unemployment beneﬁts is related to
the one of wages,a wage equation will be added to the system. A set of identities will
close the model. Let us now present the speciﬁcation in more details. For the moment we
stick on long-run relationships.
In addition to Equation (20) extended to deal with compositional changes18 and unob-
servable shocks  1t,the system includes a wage equation. The latter is based on Equation
(16) in which the determinants of θ are substituted from (18). Log-linearization leads to
the following long-run basic speciﬁcation for the average real net wage rate:
ln(w)=b0 + b1ln(y)+b2ln(φ)+b3ln(γ)+b4ln(π)+b5ln(b)+b6ln(β)+b7ln(1 + τ)
(21)
18See the end of the previous section.
















From the theoretical analysis,we expect that b1,b 3,b 5 and b6 are positive and that b4
and b7 are negative. The sign of b2 is however a priori ambiguous. Equation (22) is also
extended to deal with compositional changes and unobservable shocks  2t.19
In the system of equations,we also include relationships that link the numerator of
γ,π and ρu,namely T,EXC and b,to the level of unemployment and,where relevant to
wages and to dummies capturing known institutional changes. These equations will be
detailed when the results are presented. Finally,a set of identities close the model.The
ﬁrst identity equates the total number of wage earners and salaried employees, ETt,to
ﬁrms’ employment, Et,plus an exogenous number of workers employed in the public sector.
Second,the exogenous size of the labor force is equated to its components. Finally,we add
that the inﬂow into insured unemployment is an exogenous share of salaried employment:
U<3m
t ≡ φtETt.
In sum,we have a model with ﬁve equations,three identities and eight endogenous
variables : Et,ET t,EXC t,T t,b t,w t,U t,U<3m
t .
4.2 The results
It is well known that the choice of the correct statistical inference methodology is highly
dependent on the time series properties of the data. In particular,the question as to
whether the series are stationary is very important. When there are structural breaks,the
various Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron test statistics are biased towards the nonrejection
of a unit root. The methodology of unit-root tests with structural breaks has been applied
to the variables appearing in the system (see Perron and Vogelsang,1992). For each
variable,we conclude that the unit root hypothesis is rejected in favor of stationarity
around a segmented trend.20 Therefore standard econometric inference applies.
19This equation does not include the endogenous unemployment rate among the regressors because the
latter is a function of the determinants of θ (see (5)). So, as soon as the determinants of θ are substituted in
(16), adding the unemployment rate to the regressors can hardly be justiﬁed on the basis of our theoretical
model. Furthermore, automatic indexation of wages on the CPI explains why a real wage equation is
estimated.
20Detailed results are available upon request.
16Table 2 presents the parameters of equations (20) and (22) resulting from a FIML esti-
mation of the whole system made of the structural equations and the identities described
above. Table 2 compares the results when LMPs are assumed to be exogenous to those
when they are endogenous. Various speciﬁcations were used for the three equations mod-
eling the process of the LMPs. The signs of the parameters of interest are fairly robust to










































Dummy(72)t +  5t,
(25)
where ∆xt ≡ xt − xt−1 and Dummy(s)t is equal to 0 ∀t  = s and equal to 1 if t = s.
Misspeciﬁcation tests for equations (20) and (22) are displayed in Table 2. The same tests
were successfully applied to equations (23),(24) and (25) and are available upon request.











































) − 0.39ln(1 + τt).
(27)
Before the parameters of the LMPs are commented,let us brieﬂy consider the other
ones. As expected,the rate of job separations φ,measured by
U<3m
t
ETt ,has a negative eﬀect
21Equalities (26) and (27) are based on the estimates obtained when the LMPs are endogenous. In
the wage equation, the eﬀect of the business cycle indicator BCI2 is put equal to zero since BCI2 is the
diﬀerence between two business cycle indicators that have no reason to diverge in the long run.
17on the employment rate and the proxies for y inﬂuence positively the employment and net
wage rates. The proxy for the bargaining power,namely the rate of strikes,has a small
positive eﬀect on the net wage but not a negative one on the employment rate. The latter
impact is instead small but positive. This could be due to the quite large share of strikes
(between 30 and 40%) that do not intend to sustain wage increases but well employment
(typically in reaction to the announcement of collective dismissals). The average tax rate
τ has a the expected negative impact on net wages.22
Let us now focus on the impacts of LMPs and more speciﬁcally on their long-run
eﬀects. The replacement ratio has a negative eﬀect on the employment rate and the level
of unemployment beneﬁts is positively related to the average net wage. These results are
in line with the theoretical setting. The estimated long-run elasticities are however not
large. So,only large changes in the replacement ratio would have sizable eﬀects on the
employment rate.
In the theoretical model,increasing the rate of sanctions deteriorates the position of
the jobless workers. This has a negative eﬀect on equilibrium wages and a positive one
on θ. The estimated eﬀect on wages has a diﬀerent sign according to the assumption
made about the exogeneity of sanctions. Looking at Figure 4 and at Equation (23),we
feel conﬁdent that sanctions cannot be taken as exogenous. Then,the impact on the
wage rate is indeed negative. Yet,it is very small. Moreover,the estimated elasticity
of the employment rate with respect to the sanction rate is negative. This outcome
could hardly be explained if cx was higher than cu. So,the estimated results conﬁrm
our initial assumption. Eligibility criteria for unemployment beneﬁts are more and more
investigated by economists (see OECD,2000). However,not much is known yet about the
impacts of sanctions on unemployment. We are not aware of earlier papers that estimate
the macroeconomic eﬀect of sanctions on the employment rate.23
The theoretical model of Section 2 emphasized that training programs improve the
intertemporal utility of those currently unemployed and so have a positive eﬀect on net
22The elasticity is however far below 1 in absolute value. This could motivate the introduction of τ in
the employment equation. Doing so, unreported estimation results indicate that the parameters of interest
are not aﬀected.
23Microeconomic evidence on the eﬀect of sanctions on the hiring rate is still rather mixed. Abbring,
van den Berg and van Ours (1999) ﬁnd a very strong eﬀect of sanctions on individual transitions from
unemployment to employment in the Netherlands. Ashenfelter, Ashmore and Deschˆ enes (1999) ﬁnd the
opposite in the U.S. The former paper uses administrative data and deals with selectivity issues while the
latter is based on a randomized experiment.
18wages and a negative one on θ. For this reason,their theoretical eﬀect on the employment
rate had an ambiguous sign if cr ≥ cu >c x > 0. Our empirical results suggest a small
but negative eﬀect on wages and a positive one on the employment rate. Our conclusion
relative to wages is in accordance with the recent empirical analysis of Forslund and Kolm
(2000) for Sweden. For Belgium,Cockx and Bardoulat (1999) develop a microeconometric
evaluation of the training schemes considered in our paper. They ﬁnd a favorable eﬀect on
the hiring rates of participants. It is therefore plausible that these training schemes provide
various skills that improve the chances of being hired. However,training schemes for the
unemployed are not meant to be an alternative to formal education. Moreover,as far as
we know,the negotiated wage structures (at the sectoral or ﬁrm levels) do not explicitly
recognize the certiﬁcates delivered by the training agencies. So,in a country where long-
term unemployment is a major problem,it is plausible that training programmes improve
the ‘employability’ of job-seekers and exert a downward pressure on wages.
5 Conclusion
This paper has developed an econometric analysis based on an extension of the equilibrium
search model of Pissarides. We have tried to bridge the gap between a theoretical and
an empirical literature about the macroeconomic eﬀect of passive and active labor market
policies (LMPs) on (un)employment. The empirical literature only provides an estimation
of the parameters of interest conditional on the vacancy (or the unemployment-vacancy)
level. Yet,the main message of the recent theoretical literature is that labor market
policies presumably have an inﬂuence on wages and therefore on the number of vacant jobs.
Moreover,in many countries,the reliability of the vacancies registered by Employment
Agencies is rather dubious.
To face the challenge of a better integration of theoretical and empirical analyses,we
have ﬁrst developed a theoretical equilibrium search model of the labor market highlight-
ing the role played by both passive and active LMPs. In this model,the ratio between
vacancies and the number of job searchers (tightness on the labor market) is endogenously
determined by a set of structural and LMP parameters. (The observable proxies for) these
parameters have then been used to specify and estimate a model that focuses on the ﬁrms’
(or ‘regular’) employment rate and on wage formation. The empirical analysis has taken
care of the plausible feed-back eﬀect of unemployment on the level of LMPs.
Our estimated results provide evidence that unemployment beneﬁts have a positive,
19yet small,impact on wages and a negative one on the employment rate. The rate of
sanctions has a small negative eﬀect on wages. Their impact on the employment rate
is however negative. This can be understood if the eﬃciency of the sanctioned in the
matching process is suﬃciently lower than the one of the insured unemployed. Training
programmes have a small negative eﬀect on wages and a small positive one on employment.
The low magnitude of all these eﬀects suggests that LMPs can only contribute to a limited
extent to the rise in the employment rate to which European countries have committed
during the European council of Lisbon in March 2000. Our analysis also shows that the
results can be sensitive to the assumption made about the exogeneity LMPs.
Appendix 1
Recall our assumptions: cr ≥ cu >c x > 0,1 >ρ r ≥ ρu ≥ σ ≥ 0 and λ ≥ φ.
Proof of Proposition 1
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(cuα + π)(crα + λ)+γcrα
 
> 0
The negative sign of ∂e
∂φ is obvious from Equation 4.
20Proof that Λe − Λr,Λr − Λu and Λu − Λx are positive
To sign Λe − Λr,subtract (11) from (9) and rewrite this diﬀerence as follows:
(δ + crα + λ)(Λe − Λr)=w(1 − ρr)+( λ − φ)(Λe − Λu). (28)
Remembering (13),it is immediately seen that Λ e − Λr > 0.




[(ρr − ρu)(δ + cxα)+π(ρr − σ)+αf(α,Z)((cr − cu)(δ + cxα)+π(cr − cx))], (29)
with Da =( δ+crα+λ+γ)(δ+cxα)+π(δ+crα+λ) and f(α,Z) is given by (13). Expression
(29) would still be positive if assumption cr ≥ cu >c x was not satisﬁed provided that
ρr − ρu and/or ρr − σ were suﬃciently positive. A similar remark applies below in the
case of expression (30).
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(cxα + δ)2γcr(φ − λ)(1 − ρu)+πcx(δ + crα + λ)2[φ(σ − ρu) − (cuα + δ)
(1 − σ) ]+( cxα + δ)γcrπ(φ − λ)+πcxγ(δ + crα + λ)[φ(σ − ρr) − (crα + δ)
(1 − σ)] − π(δ + crα + λ)2[(cxα + δ)cu + πcx](1 − σ) − (cxα + δ)2γ




where Db is the denominator of (13). Under our assumptions,expression (31) is negative.
21Proof of the results in Table 1
The following partial derivatives are suﬃcient to prove the results in Table 1.
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∂φ< 0 is obvious from (13). The other properties in Table 1 are easily
derived from (8) and (17).
22Appendix 2 : Data
Regular employment. Number of workers occupied in ﬁrms on the 30th of June (wage
earners and salaried employees,excluding the public sector). Source : Bureau F´ed´ eral
du Plan. The other employment and active population indicators used in this paper also
measures workers at the end of June (Source : Minist` ere de l’Emploi et du Travail).
The rate of job termination. The numerator is the number of full-time insured unemployed
for less than three months in June (data source : Oﬃce National de l’Emploi). The
denominator measures the number of salaried workers in June (data source : Minist` ere de
l’Emploi et du Travail).
Training programs. The numerator of T is the annual number of unemployed trainees who
end a training program (data source : Oﬃce National de l’Emploi,Oﬃce Communautaire
et R´ egional de la formation Professionelle et de l’Emploi and Vlaamse Dienst voor Arbei-
dsbemiddeling en Beroepsopleiding). This indicator includes training schemes organized
by these public employment services or by other institutions or ﬁrms provided that they
are registered by the public employment services. The denominator of T is the stock of
unemployed (entitled to unemployment beneﬁts) measured at the end of June.
The rate of sanctions π. The numerator measures the annual total ﬂow of full-time insured
unemployed who are no more entitled to unemployment beneﬁts (data source : Oﬃce
National de l’Emploi). The series of disqualifying reasons include voluntary separation
from work,unavailability for a job or an active labor market policy,refusal of a suitable job
oﬀer,misconduct during unemployment (e.g. undeclared paid work),non compliance with
the administrative rules and unemployment for an ‘excessive’ duration. The denominator
is the stock of unemployed (entitled to unemployment beneﬁts) measured at the end of
June.
The replacement ratio ρ. The replacement ratio measures the ratio between the average
unemployment beneﬁt and the average net wage (both measured per head). It should be
emphasized that the numerator measures the actual average beneﬁt paid out (during the
civil year). This indicator averages the beneﬁts paid to the full-time unemployed,to the
part-time unemployed (who hold a part-time job and qualify for unemployment beneﬁts)
and to several categories who were previously unemployed,are presently out-of-the-labor
force and receive nevertheless an allowance (data source : Oﬃce National de l’Emploi and
Bureau F´ ed´ eral du Plan). No better long time series is available in Belgium. The average
net wage and tax rate (including payroll taxes) are estimated by Fatemeh Shadman-Mehta
until 1994 (IRES,Universit´e catholique de Louvain). We thank her for these data. We
have extended the data for the recent years. Both the numerator and the denominator
have been deﬂated by the CPI.
The share of women in ﬁrms’ employment sharew. Number of female workers occupied
in ﬁrms on the 30th of June divided by total ﬁrms’ employment. Source : Bureau F´ ed´ eral
du Plan.
The share of the secondary sector in total value added shares. We take the share of the
secondary sector (including the building industry) in total value added. Source : Institut
National de Statistique and Bureau F´ ed´ eral du Plan.
Business cycle indicators . These are an average of the monthly values of these indicators
over the period July of year t − 1 and June of year t. Source : our own computations
based on the business cycle indicators of the Belgian National Bank and the private bank
KBC.
Frequency of strikes . Number of strikes and lockouts (Source : I.L.O.) divided by the size
of the labour force.
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25parameter e(θ)* wage curve* vacancy supply* equilibrium θ** equilibrium e**
γ +˚ +˚˚ 0 - ?˚˚˚
λ - † - †† 0 + ? †††
π - ‡ - ‡‡ 0 + ? ‡‡‡
ρi,i= u,r 0 + 0 - -
σ 0 + 0 - -
ci,i= u,r,x + + 0 - ?
φ - + - - -
δ 0 + - - -
k 0 + - - -
β 0 + 0 - -
y 0 0 + + +
* ‘+’ (respectively,‘-’,‘0’) ≡ given θ,the function increases (respectively,decreases,remains
unchanged) as the corresponding parameter (in column 1) increases.
** ‘+’ (respectively,‘-’,‘?’) ≡ the equilibrium value increases (respectively,decreases,moves in a
direction that cannot be predicted) as the corresponding parameter (in column 1) increases.
˚i fcr <c x and cr <c u,this sign is negative.
˚˚ if cr <c x and cr <c u,this sign could become negative if ρr was suﬃciently close to ρu and σ.
˚˚˚ if cr <c x and cr <c u but the positive eﬀect on the wage curve is maintained,this sign is
negative.
† if cr <c x and cr <c u,this sign is positive.
†† if cr <c x and cr <c u,this sign could become positive if ρr was suﬃciently close to ρu and σ.
††† if cr <c x and cr <c u but the negative eﬀect on the wage curve is maintained,this sign is
positive.
‡ if cr <c x and cu <c x,this sign is positive.
‡‡ if cr <c x and cu <c x,this sign could become positive if σ was suﬃciently close to ρr and ρu.
‡‡‡ if cr <c x and cu <c x but the negative eﬀect on the wage curve is maintained,this sign is
positive.
Note: If k is proportional to y,the level of the latter does not aﬀect θ nor e.
Table 1. Comparative statics.












constant -0.217 -0.454 constant 4.317 4.611






0.804 0.791 ln(wt−1) 0.541 0.456
(15.093) (16.077) (7.650) (10.578)
∆ln(GDPt
Ett ) 0.161 0.158 ln(GDPt
Ett ) 0.810 0.930
(2.442) (2.743) (7.182) (13.347)
ln(
GDPt−1
Ett−1 ) -0.309 -0.367
(-2.523) (-4.871)
ln(BCI1t)† 0.040 0.088 ln(BCI2t)†† 0.173 0.229


























































-0.068 -0.136 ln(bt) 0.119 0.196






0.024 0.076 ln(bt−1) -0.068 -0.144












(3.606) (5.636) (1.916) (3.824)
ln(1 + τt) -0.346 -0.213
(-2.504) (-2.624)
ln(shares) 0.157 0.165 ln(shares) 0.173 0.170
(5.015) (6.041) (3.362) (4.942)
∆ln(sharew) -0.659 -0.702
(-4.345) (-8.189)
Q-stat. 1 0.894 [0.344] 0.042 [0.837] 0.010 [0.919] 3.777 [0.052]
Q-stat. 2 4.280 [0.118] 1.289 [0.525] 9.329 [0.009] 3.859 [0.145]
JB norm. test 3.182 [0.204] 0.301[0.860] 3.698 [0.157] 5.433 [0.066]
Table 2. FIML estimation of the model (Sample period: 1962-1999; t-statistics between parenthe-
ses; p-values between brackets)
After the devaluation of 1982 and during a short period in the nineties, the government introduced wage
controls. These are captured by dummies in the wage equation that are not displayed in the table. ‘Q-stat.
1’ and ‘Q-stat. 2’ are Ljung-Box Portmanteau tests of residual autocorrelation up to the second order.JB
is the Jarque-Bera normality test.
















Figure 1: Labor market ﬂows.


















b w replacement ratio firms' employment rate tax rate
b, w replacement ratio,



















Stock of unemployed Training number of sanctions
unemployment training and sanctions
Figure 3: The ﬁrms’ employment rate,Et
Lt,the average real paid out unemployment beneﬁt,
bt,the average real net wage rate, wt,the average tax rate τt and the replacement ratio
ρu.
Figure 4: The numbers of sanctions EXC and of trainees ending a program T and the




















sharew shares rate of entry strikes per 1000 active individuals y (first-differences)
sharew and shares
Figure 5: The share of the secondary sector in value added (shares),the share of women
in ﬁrms’ employment (sharew),the rate of entry into unemployment φ,the rate of strikes
per thousand of active individuals and GDP per head as a proxy for y (ﬁrst-diﬀerences in
logs).
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